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Title III of the Violence Against
Women Act: Can It Survive a
Commerce Clause Challenge in the
Wake of United States v. Lopez?
I. Introduction
In the United States of America, every five minutes a woman
is raped; every fifteen seconds a woman is beaten by her husband
or companion; every year, four thousand women are killed by their
abusers; one in one hundred forcible rapes results in a sentence of
more than one year in prison; the leading cause of death on the job
for women is homicide; medical costs related to domestic abuse are
estimated at one hundred million dollars a year.' Statistics such as
these led Congress to enact the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"), a piece of legislation with the main purpose of
providing remedies and funding to prevent and protect women
against domestic violence.2
One of the most controversial provisions of this Act is Title
III which provides a federal civil remedy for victims of violent
crimes motivated by gender.3 Congress passed Title III through its
power under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 The constitutionality of Title III has already been
challenged in two separate cases and has resulted in two very
different outcomes.
5
1. See 139 CONG. REC. H10,349-01, H1O,359 (Nov. 20, 1993).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 13,701 (1994).
3. See Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of
the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 2197 (1992).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 13,981. This comment will only address the constitutionality of
VAWA under the Commerce Clause. Although it is possible that the Supreme Court will
base its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment alone, it is this author's belief that the Court
will use this opportunity to address the repercussions of Lopez via VAWA.
5. See Bill Geroux, Suit Dismissed in Alleged Rape, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July
30, 1996, at Al. Since this comment has been written, three more cases have held that Title
III is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. These cases are: Doe v. Hartz, 970 F.
Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (holding that there was a "rational basis for Congress's
conclusion that gender-motivated violence has a substantial effect on Interstate Commerce");
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This comment addresses Title III's constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause with a focus on the possible repercussions of the
recent case of United States v. Lopez6 and its effect on the rational
basis test. Part II examines the history of VAWA with a specific
focus on Title III. Part III provides a brief overview of the
Commerce Clause while Part IV examines Lopez and the Supreme
Court's findings from that case. Part V looks at Doe v. Doe,7 the
first case in which the constitutionality of Title III was challenged
and a court determined the provision to be constitutional. Part VI
examines Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University,8 the
second case in which Title III was challenged and the first in which
a court found the provision to be unconstitutional. Part VII will
apply Title III to Lopez. Part VIII examines the opinions and
views of each Supreme Court Justice individually to determine the
justices' respective stances on the rational basis test, VAWA, and
the outcome of Lopez. Finally, Part IX will look to the possible
outcome of Title III's constitutionality should the issue eventually
reach the Supreme Court.
II. Violence Against Women Act
The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") has had a long
history in the legislative process.9 On January 14, 1991, Senator
Joseph Biden introduced the 1991 version of VAWA. t0  A
companion bill was then set forth in the House of Representatives
by Congresswoman Barbara Boxer.1' Although hearings were
held and the bill was reported out of committee, the 102nd
Congress declined to act on the bill. 12  In 1993, Senator Biden
reintroduced VAWA which was again followed by many legislative
Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (finding that although VAWA is
overbroad and sweeping, the rational basis test was met by Congress' extensive fact-finding
hearings); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that because great
deference should be given to Congress' legislative fact-findings, VAWA therefore meets the
rational basis test).
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
8. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
9. See Michelle W. Easterling, For Better or Worse: The Federalization of Domestic
Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 937-43 (1996).
10. See S. 15, 101st Cong. (1991).
11. See H.R. 1502, 101st Cong. (1991).
12. See Birgit Schmidt am Busch, Domestic Violence and Title III of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 (1995).
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hearings." Finally, on September 13, 1994, three years after its
initial introduction, President Clinton signed the bill into law as
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994.14
VAWA provides remedies and funding to prevent and to
protect women from domestic violence.15  These provisions
include grants for: helping law enforcement and prosecutors reduce
violent crime against women;1 6 improving public transit areas; 7
encouraging the mandatory arrests of boyfriends and spouses guilty
of domestic violence; 8 and providing battered women shelters, 9
a national domestic violence hotline,20 and youth education.2'
The Act also includes community programs on domestic violence
22
in addition to education and training on domestic violence for
judges and court personnel in state courts. 23  Furthermore,
VAWA enacts federal penalties for sex crimes24 and new evident-
iary rules for sexual histories in both criminal and civil cases.
25
A. Provisions and Purpose of Title III
Perhaps the most controversial provision of VAWA is Title III
which is entitled "Civil Rights For Women. ' '26 Title III contains
four main sections that provide a civil remedy for victims of violent
crimes motivated by gender.27 The first section holds that all
persons have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated
13. See id.
14. See Tracy L. Hulsey, Violence Against Women Act, 7 S.C. LAW. 38, 39 (1996).
President Clinton had pledged to sign VAWA as part of his election campaign in 1992. See
am Busch, supra note 12, at 5.
15. See Jim McDermott, National Action Is Needed to Stop Violence Against Women,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 6, 1991, at Al.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796(gg) (1994).
17. See id. § 13,931.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 13,951.
20. See id. § 10,416.
21. See id. § 10,417.
22. See id. § 10,418.
23. See id. § 14,036.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 14,011.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994).
26. See generally am Busch, supra note 12 (discussing the history and provisions of Title
III).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 13,981.
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by gender.2 The third section permits a cause of action against
a person who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender
29
while the fourth section defines a crime of violence and a crime of
violence motivated by gender.3" The fifth section states that no
cause of action exists for random acts of violence not motivated by
gender.3' Additionally, Title III also provides that prosecutions
under this section do not require that a prior criminal complaint,
prosection, or conviction exist against the alleged attacker.32
Furthermore, both the federal and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over crimes brought under this provision,33 and a
victim of gender-motivated violence may bring a civil action against
an assailant in either court in order to recover compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.34
The goals of Title III are threefold: to serve a national
purpose in changing the public's attitude about violence against
women, to bring gender-motivated crimes in line with that of other
bias-motivated attacks so that the treatment of all bias crimes will
be equal, and to provide victims with new remedies which are not
presently available to them in state courts.35  After extensive
28. See id. This section states:
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of
Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights
of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and
activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause
of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.
Id.
29. See id. This section states: "All persons within the United States shall have the right
to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender." Id.
30. See id. "[T]he term 'crime of violence motivated by gender' means a crime of
violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part,
to an animus based on the victim's gender ...." Id. "[T]he term 'crime of violence' means
an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person ... and ... that
would constitute a felony ... but for the relationship between the person who takes such
action and the individual against whom such action is taken." Id.
31. See id. "Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under
subsection (c) of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that
cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender."
Id.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 13,981. "Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint,
prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection (c)
of this section." Id.
33. See id. "The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over actions
brought pursuant to this part." Id.
34. See Hulsey, supra note 14, at 39.
35. See Willis, supra note 3, at 2201-03.
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legislative hearings,36 Congress determined these goals to serve as
the basis of Title III.
B. Legislative Fact-Finding for Title III
Congress held hearings in various states in order to determine
the effects of domestic violence on women.37 Through these
hearings Congress learned that domestic violence, including that of
violent crimes against women,3" was a prominent problem through-
out the United States,39 and that federal action was necessary in
order to address this ever growing problem."a Sally Goldfarb, a
senior staff attorney with the National Organization of Women
Legal Defense Fund, presented testimony at one of these hear-
ings.4 She testified that women are most often targets for gender-
based violence and, therefore, Title III was needed.42 Goldfarb
also commented that women must fear both crimes which confront
all members of society along with those crimes that are inflicted
exclusively or overwhelmingly on the female portion of the
population.43 Goldfarb additionally noted that Title III would
36. See Easterling, supra note 9, at 937-38.
37. See Hearings on Domestic Violence, 103d Cong. (1993) (hearings held in Massachu-
setts); Violent Crimes Against Women, 103d Cong. (1993) (hearings held in Utah); Violence
Against Women: Fighting the Fear, 103d Cong. (1993) (hearings held in Maine).
38. See 139 CONG. REC. H10,349-01, H10,359 (Nov. 20,1993). Among the statistics set
forth were: "[I]n this country, every 5 minutes a woman is raped, every 15 seconds a woman
is beaten by her husband or companion, and every year 4,000 women are killed by their
abusers." Id.
39. See 140 CONG. REc. S7217-07, S7218 (June 21, 1994). Representative Boxer
remarked at one hearing that "we have more shelters in this county for animals then we do
for women and children." Id.
40. See 139 CONG. REC. at H10,360. Representative Olver submitted into the record
a letter that was sent to him by a female constituent in Massachusetts. See id. This letter
spoke of the five years of physical and psychological abuse that this woman had suffered at
the hands of husband. See id. The letter mentioned the times he had shot a gun at her, shot
arrows at her, set her hair on fire, and hit her repeatedly. See id. He additionally
endangered her daughter and caused them both to live a constant nightmare. See id. At the
time of the letter, this man was finally in jail but would be out in two years for good
behavior. See id. at H10,361. The woman mentioned in her letter that for five years her
husband "has slowly and painfully killed me." Id. "I don't live anymore; I only exist." Id.
41. See id. at H10,364.
42. See id.
43. See id. Goldfarb noted how Title III narrows the scope of these crimes by deleting
a presumption that rape and sexual assault are motivated by gender; the bill instead requires
the plaintiff to prove that the crime was due at least in part to an animus based on gender.
See id. However, Goldfarb also noted that this civil rights remedy is favorable in its gender-
neutrality and availability to both male or female victims of gender-motivated crimes. See
id.
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hopefully provide a remedy for women not only by changing the
mentality of society concerning gender-based crimes' but also by
adding federal laws to protect women and to compensate for
inadequate state laws.a" Goldfarb further set out the reasoning
behind Congress's authority to enact this legislation: domestic
violence impacts women to the extent that it damages the national
economy.4 6 Based on this testimony, along with the testimony of
many other people, Congress determined that the passage of
VAWA was a vital necessity.
4 7
C. Opponents and Advocates of Title III
Although Congress viewed VAWA as a necessity, from its
inception, this Act has had both opponents and proponents.
4
Opponents believe VAWA is unconstitutional because it is an
improper use of federal power for the federal government to
become involved in criminal cases which do not involve state action
or substantially affect interstate commerce. 9 Challengers see Title
III as a provision which accuses both the police, acting as an arm
of the state, and a rapist, acting on his own criminal volition, of
oppressing the individual victim.50 They also argue that Congress
has exceeded its authority by enacting legislation that deals with
common tort laws which are strictly state matters. 51  Opponents
of VAWA view the federal government's job to be that of dealing
with matters concerning only the functioning of the federal
44. See id. Society often views sexual assault and domestic violence with a bias of "boys
will be boys" and a "she must have asked for it" mentality. Id.
45. See 139 CONG. REC. at H10,364. Several states have statutes exempting cohabitants
and dating companions from sexual assault laws. See id. Furthermore, a study showed that
only one in one hundred forcible rapes results in a sentence of more than one year in prison.
See id. Finally, state prosecutors, juries, and judges often subject female victims of rape and
domestic violence to unfair and degrading treatment which contributes to the low rates of
reporting and conviction of these crimes. See id.
46. See id. at H10,365. Among the statistics set forth were: domestic violence costs
employers three to five billion dollars annually due to worker absenteeism, medical costs
related to domestic abuse are estimated at one hundred million dollars a year, high rates of
rape and other crimes deter women from taking many types of jobs including high paying
night jobs that would require travel on unsafe streets and public transportation, and homicide
is the leading cause of death on the job for women. See id.
47. See Easterling, supra note 9, at 937-43.
48. See Geroux, supra note 5.
49. See id.
50. See Women's Rights, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1996, at A10.
51. See Edward McDonough, When Congress Offends Constitution, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Aug. 4, 1996, at AA3.
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government itself.52 This expansion of federal law into state court
arenas is, thus, too broad and too far reaching for Congress's
power.53 Even supporters of women's rights have problems with
Title III because it divides rape into categories ranging from date
rape to gang rape thereby creating various degrees of rape rather
than criminalizing all rapes equally.5 4 Opponents of the bill feel
that instead of creating new penalties for bigoted or hate related
crimes of rape, a straightforward remedy of stiffening jail sentences
for all rapes would be the preferred requirement.5 5
On the other hand, advocates of the law believe that state laws
have failed to curb the growing violence against women making it
necessary for the federal government to step in and enact stronger
laws.56 One specific ramification of uncurbed violence is its effect
on the economy due to the high rate of absenteeism at work and
job losses suffered by victims of violent acts.57 Additionally,
supporters hope that VAWA will help to reverse hundred year old
cultural norms which gave some men the idea that spousal abuse
is an accepted practice.5" Furthermore, supporters of the act agree
with Congress' decision to classify some rapes as hate crimes
because advocates believe rape is not an act of passion but a crime
of hatred, anger, and power against women.59 For these reasons,
supporters feel it is necessary to have stronger laws which will
protect women from the violence they suffer.6"
A prominent reason for the enactment of Title III was to
enable women to bring civil suits against their attackers.6"
However, an obstacle to this purpose exists in that alleged attackers
being sued under this provision have already tried to strike down
Title III by attacking its constitutionality.62  Before discussing
these challenges more specifically, a brief examination of the
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 13.
55. See id.
56. See Geroux, supra note 5.
57. See id.
58. See Rachel L. Jones, Quest for Peace: Two Steps Forward and One Back on
Domestic Abuse, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 1996, at 6.
59. See McDermott, supra note 15.
60. See Geroux, supra note 5.
61. See McDonough, supra note 51.
62. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
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evolution of the Commerce Clause, one of the powers Congress
used in order to enact Title III, is necessary.
63
II. The History of the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause has been a source of great power for
Congress for many years.6" However, while it has taken quite
some time for Congress to gain this power, the recent Supreme
Court ruling of United States v. Lopez65 may once again limit
Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause.'
The first case to provide Congress with power under the
Commerce Clause was Gibbons v. Ogden.67 In Gibbons, Chief
Justice Marshall produced the catalyst for Congress to begin using
its power under the Commerce Clause through his broad reaching
statement concerning power: "[P]ower ... is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent and acknowledges no
limitations other than those prescribed in the [C]onstitution.
' 68
However, the Nineteenth Century presented few opportunities
to apply this definition because little need for federal regulation
existed, and the Supreme Court did not face many Commerce
Clause challenges. 69 In the late Nineteenth Century, the Supreme
Court narrowed its view of the Commerce Clause, via Hammer v.
Dagenhart,7 ° by finding that although Congress had the power to
regulate interstate commerce, it did not have the power to prohibit
it.71 Hammer limited Congress' power under the Commerce
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (1994). Because Congress passed VAWA based on both the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, a court need only uphold the Act under
one of these powers for Title III to be constitutional. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616. Conse-
quently, a court must strike the Act down under both the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment for the Act to be unconstitutional. See Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 785 (W.D. Va. 1996).
64. "The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
65. 514 U.S. 549.
66. See generally Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367
(1996) (discussing the history of the Commerce Clause).
67. 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (involving a conflict over state and federal licensing for
steamboats).
68. Id. at 196.
69. See Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (1995).
70. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (challenging the constitutionality of the Child Labor Act).
71. See id. at 271-72.
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Clause, and some time passed before Congress regained that
power.72
In the years following Hammer, the "direct test" was used as
the standard for determining an act's constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause.73 The Supreme Court found that an activity
could be regulated by Congress if the activity had a direct effect on
interstate commerce even though the activity might not be
characterized as part of interstate commerce.
74
The New Deal ushered in a new societal change and brought
with it another phase of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.7' The first case of this new era was United States v.
Darby.76 In Darby, the Court created the standard for the
rational basis test by holding that Congress had the power to pass
legislation as long as it reasonably believed that the legislation
would be beneficial to the economy.
77
One of the most noted cases from this era is Wickard v.
Filburn.78 Mr. Filburn, a small wheat farmer, brought suit claim-
ing that Congress did not have power under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act to regulate how many acres of wheat a farmer
could use for his own personal benefit.79  The Supreme Court
stated that although Filburn was just one small farmer, if other
farmers with excess wheat acted as Filburn had, the combined
effect of their excess wheat would be great.8' This cumulative
effect would, in turn, have a substantial effect on the economy
thereby giving Congress a rational basis for promulgating a law to
require the amount of wheat an individual farmer sowed.8' This
ruling provided Congress great breadth to regulate many activities
which alone would not have a substantial effect on the economy
72. See generally Alan R. Arkin, Inconsistencies in Modem Federalism Jurisprudence,
70 TUL. L. REV. 1569, 1576-78 (1996) (discussing the history of the Commerce Clause).
73. See Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce
Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 731 (1996).
74. See id. An example of the "direct test" can be found in the Shreveport Rate Cases.
See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (involving federal
controls placed on railroad rates between interstate and intrastate railroad stops).
75. See Graglia, supra note 73, at 731.
76. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (involving the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
77. See Arkin, supra note 72, at 1580-82.
78. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
79. See id. at 113-15.
80. See id. at 127-28.
81. See id.
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but in the aggregate would have such an effect on interstate
commerce.
82
In recent years, Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
has greatly expanded. Congress has both protected civil rights with
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196483 and federalized crime
under Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.84
Although the rational basis test has been the standard for
many years, in the recent case of Lopez, the Supreme Court has
attempted to redefine Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause.85 This decision has led to much concern over the future
of Congress' legislative powers.
8 6
IV. United States v. Lopez
A. Pertinent Facts of Lopez
In Lopez, the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 which Congress passed
under its Commerce Clause power.87 The defendant was a twelfth
grade student who arrived at school in San Antonio, Texas with a
concealed .38 caliber handgun.88 He was arrested and charged
under Texas law, but these charges were dismissed after federal
agents charged him with violating the Gun-Free School Zones
Act.89 A federal grand jury indicted the defendant, and he moved
to dismiss on the grounds that section 922(q) was unconstitu-
tional.9" The district court denied his motion, and the defendant
was found guilty after a bench trial.9 Defendant appealed his
conviction on the basis that Congress exceeded its power under the
82. See Michael C. Carroll & Paul Dehmel, United States v. Lopez: Reevaluating
Congressional Authority Under the Commerce Clause, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 579, 592-93
(1995).
83. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
84. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
85. See generally Zeigler, supra note 66 (discussing the Court's recent decision in
Lopez).
86. See Leon Lazer & William E. Hellerstein, Tiptoeing Through the Tulips: The
Supreme Court's Major, but Modest by Comparison, Criminal Law Rulings During the 1994-
95 Term, 12 TOURO L. REv. 267, 269 (1996).
87. This Act makes it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place that the individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a school
zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994).
88. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 551-52.
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Commerce Clause in passing the Act.92 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Act was unconstitutional and
reversed the defendant's conviction.93  The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and upheld the Fifth Circuit's ruling in a five to
four decision.94
B. Supreme Court Analysis
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Majority, started with
a history of the Commerce Clause and Congress' related powers.95
This history developed the three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power.96 The
Court found that Section 922(q) fell under the third category of
those activities that had a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce.97 The Court then considered other cases where it upheld
congressional legislation regulating intrastate economic activity
because the activity had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.
98
The Court stated that where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, the legislation will usually be up-
held.99 Wickard v. Filburn'° was the most far reaching example
of this Commerce Clause authority.' t The Court noted that the
activity in Wickard involved economics in a way that the possession
of a gun in a school zone did not because section 922(q) had
nothing to do with commerce or economic enterprise. 10 2 Further-
more, the Court found that section 922(q) was not part of a larger
92. See id. at 522.
93. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 558-59. Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce,
it may protect and regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce-or persons or
things in interstate commerce, and it may regulate those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. See id.
97. See id. The Court quickly dismissed the other two categories from consideration.
See id.
98. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60. The Court noted that while case law was unclear as
to whether an activity must "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order
to be within Congress's power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause, it decided that,
under the great weight of case law, the proper test is whether the regulated activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce. See id.
99. See id. at 560.
100. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
101. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
102. See id. at 561.
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regulation of economic activity.103  For these reasons, section
922(q) could not be sustained under other cases which upheld the
regulation of activities that arose out of a commercial transaction




The Court also found section 922(q) problematical because it
did not contain a jurisdictional element which would examine each
case separately in order to ensure that the firearm possession in
question affected interstate commerce. °5 Without this element,
there would be no limit to the reach of congressional control over
firearm possessions that did not have an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce.
10 6
Furthermore, Congress made no legislative findings as to the
effect of guns in schools on interstate commerce when it passed
section 922(q). 1°7 The Court stated that while Congress is not
required to make such findings, these facts would have enabled the
Court to evaluate the legislation more effectively.108
The Supreme Court also determined that possession of a gun
in a school is not an economic activity which, taken in the aggre-
gate sum, would substantially affect interstate commerce. 109 The
Court was unwilling to pile inference upon inference as to the
effect of this activity on interstate commerce in order to uphold
section 922(q) as constitutional.' 0 Acknowledging that prior
cases had given a great deal of deference to congressional action,
the court decided such expansion would stop at this case."'
Because Lopez did not specifically overrule any earlier
precedent, this holding has left many lower courts, along with
Congress, unsure as to the standard of review necessary for
Commerce Clause legislation. 1 2 This uncertainty is evident in the
first two lower court cases to determine Title III's constitutionality;
while the first case found the provision to be constitutional under
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 562.
106. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 563.
109. See id. at 567.
110. See id.
111. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
112. See Alan T. Dicky, United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court Reasserts the
Commerce Clause as a Limit on the Power of Congress, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1207 (1996).
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the Commerce Clause,113 the second case disagreed and held that
Title III was unconstitutional.1 4
V. Doe v. Doe
A. The Facts of Doe
The first case to test the constitutionality of Title III was Doe
v. Doe115 which was brought in the United States District Court
of Connecticut before the Honorable Janet Bond Arterton.
11 6
The plaintiff, using a pseudonym, accused her multimillionaire
husband of spousal abuse.'17 She alleged that the defendant
continuously inflicted a violent pattern of abuse and cruelty upon
her by "throwing her to the floor, kicking her, throwing sharp and
dangerous objects at her, [and] threatening to kill her." '18 Plain-
tiff further claimed that her husband's actions reduced her to being
nothing more than his slave, 9 and she sought damages based on
this deprivation of her federal right to be free from her husband's
alleged gender-based violence."
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
based on the grounds that Title III of VAWA was unconstitution-
al. 21 The claim stated that Congress lacked authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact this provision.122  Additionally, the
defendant argued that VAWA was an open invitation for the
federal government to intervene in any area of one's life.
123
However, the court dismissed this claim and found that Title III
113. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
114. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.
1996).
115. 929 F. Supp. at 608.
116. See id.
117. See Women Violence Act OK'D, NAT'L L.J., July 1, 1996, at A8.
118. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 608. More specifically, these charges included being thrown
down stairs, hurled against a wall, and kicked, shoved, and pushed. See Jan Vertefeuille,
Brzonkala Case Bolstered by Ruling?, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, June 22, 1996, at
C1. Additionally, the wife said that her husband kept a loaded shotgun in the house and
repeatedly threatened her with it. See id.
119. Jane Doe claimed that her husband forced her to lay out his clothes for his many
extramarital affairs and to take care of his mistress' poodle. See Vertefeuille, supra note 118.
120. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610. The lawsuit sought at least $50,000 in damages based
on the permanent physical and mental injuries the woman suffered at the hands of her
husband. See Vertefeuille, supra note 118.
121. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610.
122. See Vertefeuille, supra note 118.
123. See id.
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was constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it was
reasonably adopted and narrowly tailored to accomplish a constitu-
tionally permitted end.1
4
B. The Lower Court's Analysis
The court began its analysis by determining that VAWA
should be considered under the category of activities which
substantially affect interstate commerce and carries with it a
rational basis standard of review.12' The court looked at various
precedents interpreting the Commerce Clause, including United
States v. Lopez, 126 in order to determine whether Title III was
constitutional under the rational basis test.
12 1
The court found that Lopez did not overrule the rational basis
test. 2 1 Rather, Lopez merely warns that in order for an act to be
constitutional, the effect upon interstate commerce may not be
indirect and remote. 129 Additionally, the court found that, unlike
Lopez, VAWA was accompanied by legislative findings that
supported its passage. 3' The court deduced from these congres-
sional findings that an explicit connection existed between the
activity regulated in VAWA and interstate commerce; therefore,
Congress was not attempting to pile inference upon inference in
order to pass Title 111.131
The court then determined that Congress had a rational basis
for VAWA because the activity that Title III regulates substantially
affects interstate commerce; 132 the court premised this finding on
its holding in Wickard v. Filburn'33 The court analogized the
effect that home grown wheat could have on commerce when
thousands of farmers exceeded their quota to the effect that
gender-based violence could have by limiting a woman's participa-
124. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610.
125. See id. at 612. This analysis required the finding that Congress had a rational basis
for enacting the provision. If a rational basis is shown, then the means chosen by Congress
had to be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. See id.
126. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
127. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 612.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 613.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 614.
132. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614.
133. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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tion in the workplace. 34 The court also noted that after Lopez,
many courts throughout the country have upheld a variety of
federal criminal and civil enactments as constitutional under the
Commerce Clause. 135  Furthermore, the court found that VAWA
does not encroach on traditional areas of state law because the
provision is expressly limited only to causes of action for gender-
motivated crimes. 136  Moreover, VAWA does not preclude a
person from bringing a state law claim.'37 For these reasons, the
court found that Congress had a rational basis for enacting Title
111.138 The court then moved to a second argument under the
rational basis test, whether the scheme of the provision was
reasonably adapted to its intended end.3 9
Congress enacted Title III because traditional state laws did
not do enough to protect women adequately from gender-based
crimes."' The court relied on Senate findings that state laws
have often treated crimes disproportionately; they have treated
those crimes affecting women less seriously than those affecting
men. Therefore, the court found that the statutory scheme set
forth by Congress was reasonably adapted to an end permitted by
the Constitution. 4' The court based this holding on both the
important nature of the crime sought to be controlled and the prior
precedent related to other federal civil rights remedies upheld as
constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
142
Although the District Court for the District of Connecticut
found Title III of VAWA to be constitutional, the Western District
134. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614.
135. See id. at 615. See, e.g., United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996)
(interference with access to reproductive health clinics); Aroostook County Reg'l
Opthomology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (NLRB dispute); United States
v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1996) (car jacking); Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580
(D. Me. 1995) (involving Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v.
Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (failure to pay child support).
136. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 612.
139. See id. at 616.
140. See id. at 615. The court went on to comment how even the Supreme Court has
recognized that bias-inspired crimes are thought to provoke greater harm. See Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993).
141. See Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616.
142. See id. at 617. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); and Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
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of Virginia did not follow Connecticut's lead.'43 The second case
to determine the constitutionality of Title III was Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic & State University'" which came to a conclu-
sion opposite to that of Doe. 145  The Brzonkala conclusion may
have a disturbing and lingering effect on victims of gender-based
crimes because it found Title III to be unconstitutional under both
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.'
46
VI. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University
A. Facts and Procedural History
On the night of September 21, 1994, Christy Brzonkala, a
freshman at Virginia Polytechnic and State University ("VPI"), and
another female student, Hope Hadley, met Antonio Morrison and
James Crawford in a room on the third floor of Christy's dormit-
ory.14' At one point during the evening Hadley and Crawford
left the room;'" fifteen minutes after their departure, Morrison
requested intercourse with Christy.'4 9  She told him "no.'
150
When Christy tried to leave, Morrison forced her onto the bed,
stripped her, and forced her to submit to vaginal intercourse."'
Christy attempted to push him off, but before she could, Crawford
returned to the room.152  Crawford exchanged places with Morri-
son, and he forced Christy to submit to vaginal intercourse with
143. See Geroux, supra note 5.
144. 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va. 1996).
145. Doe and Brzonkala filed their suits just five days apart in December of 1995. See
Vertefeuille, supra note 118. However, unlike Doe, which involved domestic violence,
Brzonkala had its basis in gang rape. Compare Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 772 with Doe, 929
F. Supp. at 608.
146. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 779.
147. See id. Christy stated that she knew the men only by their given names and their
status as members of the football team. See id. at 781.
148. See id. at 781-82.
149. See id.
150. See id. Christy later said, regarding the incident, "I wish I had screamed." Rivera
Live (CNBC television broadcast, July 30, 1996).
151. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 785. There is some debate as to Christy's mental
state at the time of the incident. In her complaint, Brzonkala alleges that the two men
forced her to have intercourse through, among other things, her "mental incapacity and
physical helplessness." Id. Additionally, after the incident Morrison announced in the dining
hall that he likes "to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them." Id. Furthermore,
Crawford testified at a school-held hearing that Brzonkala was "really drunk" when the
incident took place. Id. However, Christy stated that she was not inebriated at the time of
the assaults. See id.
152. See id.
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him by pinning down her arms and placing his knees against her
legs.153 When Crawford finished, Morrison took his place and
forced Christy to submit to vaginal intercourse for a third time.
154
After Morrison was finished with Christy, he told her, "You better
not have any fucking diseases." '155
Christy filed a complaint in February of 1995 after recognizing
Morrison and Crawford as the two men who had sexually assaulted
her.156  VPI held a hearing in which Morrison admitted he had
sexual contact with Christy even though she had told him "no"
twice. 57 Crawford denied any sexual contact with Christy.158 The
school judiciary committee found Morrison guilty of sexual assault
and suspended him for two semesters. 1 9 Morrison later appealed
the ruling, but an appeals officer upheld the sanction."6  A
second hearing was then held in which the school judiciary
committee found Morrison guilty of abusive conduct and imposed
a sanction of an immediate two-year suspension which Morrison
again appealed. t6 ' VPI set aside the sanction and allowed him to
return in the fall of 1995.162
Brzonkala brought suit in the Western District of Virginia
before the Honorable Jackson L. Kaiser.16 3 One of the allega-
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. Neither Morrison nor Crawford used a condom. See id. Following the assaults,
Brzonkala became depressed, stopped attending classes, and attempted to commit suicide.
See id. at 774. Although a licensed VPI psychiatrist then treated her with anti-depressant
medication, no VPI employee attempted more than a cursory inquiry into the source of
Brzonkala's distress. See id.
156. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782. After filing the complaint, Christy learned that




159. See id. The committee found that there was not enough evidence to convict Craw-
ford. See id.
160. See id.
161. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
162. See id. VPI never gave Christy any notice that Morrison was being allowed to
return to school. See id. She learned of his return through a newspaper article which
explained that, at the second hearing, the committee had found Morrison guilty of a reduced
charge of "using abusive language." Id. Christy feared for her personal safety once she
learned Morrison would be present on the VPI campus in the fall, and she canceled her plans
to return to VPI for the fall semester. See id.
163. See id. at 776. Judge Kaiser also held that the Virginia Military Institute should not
be opened to women; he was later overruled by the United States Supreme Court. See Cathy
Young, Rule of Law: Crime, the Constitution, and the 'Weaker' Sex, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21,
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tions in her complaint was a violation of Title III of VAWA.' 6
She filed suit against VPI, William Landsidle (in his capacity as
comptroller for the Commonwealth of Virginia), Antonio Morrison,
James Crawford, and Cornell Brown-another member of the VPI
football team.165  The court dismissed the claims against VPI,
William Landsidle, and Cornell Brown before deciding whether
Brzonkala had a claim under Title III and whether Title III wasconstitutional."6
B. Finding a Claim Under Title III
First, Judge Kaiser analyzed whether Brzonkala stated a claim
under Title III which requires a rape to be gender-motivated.
167
This determination process of whether an assault is gender-
motivated is akin to the method used in civil rights cases to prove
race or sex discrimination.
161
The court looked at many factors in order to determine the
merit of Brzonkala's claim that her attackers' actions "were
motivated wholly by a discriminatory animus toward her gender
and were not random acts of violence.' ' 169 The court found that
it could classify the rape as a "gang rape" since both Morrison and
Crawford took turns raping the victim. 7 Furthermore, Morrison
1996, at A15.
164. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 776. Christy never filed criminal charges because she
believed her failure to preserve physical evidence foreclosed any possibility of a criminal
prosecution. See id. at 774.
165. See id. at 781.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 784. VAWA requires subjective proof on a case by case basis. See id.
Whether the crime is gender-motivated is a question for the court or jury to decide. See id.
168. See id. The court additionally found that the guidelines for identifying hate crimes
would also be an acceptable standard for this case. See id.
169. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784.
170. See id. The court took pains to state how all rapes are not alike, and some rapes
would not fall under the necessary requirements of VAWA. See id. Judge Kaiser stated that
gang rape is more egregious than one-on-one rape. See id. He then went on to classify
stranger rape and gang rape as more egregious than date rape. See id. He based this theory
on his idea that date rape could involve a misunderstanding and is often less violent. See id.
Furthermore, he evinced the thought that date rape involves a situation where a man's sexual
passion provokes the rape by decreasing the man's control. By Judge Kaiser's standrds, date
rape seems to be less onerous than gang rape in which Judge Kaiser feels there are no
passions involved. See id. Senator Orin Hatch also echoed this sentiment. See Reva B.
Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2200
(1996). When discussing VAWA, Senator Hatch stated that Congress tried to limit this
remedy by allowing only gender-based crimes to be included. See id. The reasoning behind
this was that if a man loves a woman and rapes her, it is not as bad as a man who picks a
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made several derogatory statements which indicated that this rape
was gender-based.'71 The court found that Morrison, through his
comments, evidenced a disrespect for Brzonkala, irrespective of her
personality, especially because he had just met her for the first time
that evening. 7 2  Additionally, Morrison's statements seemed to
indicate that he had disrespect for the class of women as a whole,
and he transferred or manifested this disrespect through sexual
intercourse.173 Based on these factors, the court found that
Brzonkala had stated a claim under Title III against Morrison.174
C. Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause
The court then proceeded to determine that Title III was
unconstitutional under both the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment.'75 The court found that Title III ad-
dressed conduct that fell under a category of activities which
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause if they have a
substantial relation to interstate commerce. 76 In order to deter-
mine whether Title III was constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, the court looked at four main points.177 First, the court
looked at the nature of the regulated activity and determined that
if the interstate activity was not economic in nature, it had to be
given more careful consideration.178 Second, the court stated that
Lopez requires that an act have a jurisdictional element to ensure
a case-by-case analysis of whether a disputed activity affects
interstate commerce.1 79  Third, the court found that Lopez
requires findings by Congress concerning the legislation's effect on
interstate commerce.8 ' Lastly, the court noted that it was neces-
woman up, tells her he hates women, and rapes her. See id.
171. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784. See also supra notes 151-56 and accompanying
text.
172. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 785.
173. See id.
174. See id. The court deemed it unnecessary to determine whether a claim against
Crawford existed since the holding of the case would find Title III to be unconstitutional.
See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. This is the one point upon which both Doe and Brzonkala agree. However,
the similarities end here,
177. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 786.




sary to look at the practical implications of Title III and the
Commerce Clause.
181
The court turned to the differences and similarities between
the statute in Lopez and the case at bar; three main differences
were noted.182 First, while section 922(q) had no congressional
findings to support it, VAWA had a plethora of reasons for its
passage. 8 3 However, the court believed that although such findings
were necessary, they were not an integral part of the case and
would not affect the determination of the provision's constitu-
tionality.184 Second, the court looked at how Title III is a civil
statute while section 922(q) was criminal in nature.1 85 Again, the
court found that this difference was not substantial since Title III
was also, in actuality, criminal in nature even though it allowed a
civil cause of action. 86 Furthermore, the court found that it did
not matter whether the basis of the legislation was civil or criminal
because an act's constitutionality depends on whether the legisla-
tion is regulating interstate activities."87 Third, the court noted
that the steps of causation in determining whether the activity is
regulating interstate commerce were less in VAWA than in Lopez;
however, the court believed that the greater number of steps did
not necessarily indicate that the remoteness between the activity
and the effect on interstate commerce was greater.188 Indeed, the
court did not see this as the way to effectively determine Com-
merce Clause cases because the number of steps were actually
inconsequential.'89 Instead, the court found that the sole determi-
native factor was that both section 922(q) and Title III involved
regulated activities which were too remote from interstate com-
merce.9 ° After determining these differences, the court then
proceeded to look at the similarities between section 922(q) and
Title 111.191
181. See id. at 788.
182. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 789.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 790.
185. See id.
186. See id. The court found that because Title III deals with rape and domestic
violence, it is essentially a criminal statute. See id.
187. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 790.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 791.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 791.
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First, VAWA regulates local criminal activity not economic
activity.9 2  The court found that Lopez limits activity which is
non-economic in nature.'93 In other words, after Lopez, cases
must be economic in nature in order for Congress to regulate them
under the Commerce Clause.'94 Second, the court found that
VAWA does not have a jurisdictional requirement.' Although
this requirement may not be necessary, the court considered the
jurisdictional requirement here because Congress had placed such
a requirement in other statutes similar to Title 111.196 Finally, the
court held that, similar to the situation in Lopez, Title III would
result in extending Congress' power and tipping the balance away
from the states.197 The court found that if an act like this were
constitutional, it would allow Congress to regulate any activity by
an individual. 9 For all of these reasons, the court held that Title
III of VAWA was unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause.199
In conclusion, the court found that a serious problem concern-
ing violence against women did exist; consequently, Congress could
feasibly address this problem with a properly drafted statute within
the parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment."° However, the
court held that Title III of VAWA was unconstitutional under both
the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. °'
192. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 791-92.
193. See id. The court, at this point, took the time to address the Doe case. See id. It
found that the Doe court was incorrect in basing its results on the Wickard case. See id. The
court here found that Wickard was economic in nature, and, after Lopez, Congress is no
longer able to address cases that are in no way economic in nature. See id. Therefore, the




197. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 792.
198. See id.
199. See id. Judge Kaiser also addressed Title III's constitutionality under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 795. The court found that although Congress' first goal of
remedying gender-based deficiencies in the state's criminal justice system was legitimate,
Congress' means were not since Title III does not stop violations in the state's criminal
justice system nor does it compensate victims for denial of their rights. See id. at 800.
Furthermore, the court found that Congress' second goal of remedying private individuals'
gender-based violence was not legitimate since no sufficient contact existed between the
activity and the state because the state neither allows a person to sexually assault another
nor performs the sexual assault itself. See id. at 797.
200. See id. at 801.
201. See id.
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VII. Title III Analysis Under the Commerce Clause
Five district courts have decided the constitutionality of Title
III, and a circuit split has arisen in the lower courts. 2°2 The
parties involved are likely to file writs of certiorari with the
Supreme Court which will hopefully decide the constitutionality of
Title III and thus resolve the circuit split.
203
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez, Title III of
VAWA would most likely have been analyzed under prior
precedent establishing the simple rational basis test.20 4 Under this
test, Congress would only have to prove that it had a rational basis
in passing Title III because of the effect of domestic violence on
interstate commerce.2 5 Title III would most likely pass this test
based on the fact-findings and hearings by Congress which showed
that domestic violence impacts the economy by causing victims of
gender-motivated crimes to lose performance capacity at their jobs,
thereby hurting interstate commerce. 206  However, the recent
Lopez decision has left both Congress and the lower courts
confused as to what standard of review is required when determin-
ing whether legislation is constitutional under the Commerce
Clause.20 7
Lopez has been considered to be everything from a "flash in
the pan" to the case that will usher in a new age of restraint.2 8
Although Lopez modified the law of the Commerce Clause, the
exact extent of this modification is unknown.2 9 Many scholars
have scrutinized Lopez and offer differing interpretations of the
202. See supra Parts V., VI.
203. Brzonkala has appealed her case to the Fourth Circuit. See Former Va. Tech Student
Appeals Ruling in Rape, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 1996, at Be.
204. See supra Part 1II.
205. See United States v. Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
206. See 139 CONG. REC. H10,349-01, H10,365 (Nov. 20, 1993).
207. Justice Breyer, in his dissent, remarked that the Majority's holding creates a problem
in that "it threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed
reasonably well settled." Lopez, 515 U.S. at 630.
208. See Richard Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 167 (1996).
209. See Russet F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 71 (1996).
This was the first time in roughly 60 years that the Supreme Court had declared a statute
directed at private entities under the Commerce Clause to be unconstitutional. See Graglia,
supra note 73, at 731.
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case and its effect on the Commerce Clause.21° By applying Title
III to these various interpretations, it may be possible to predict the
Supreme Court's determination of the constitutionality of this
provision.
A. The Heightened Fact-Finding Test
The Supreme Court in Lopez severely reprimanded Congress
for providing little or no fact finding as the basis for section 922-
(q).21 ' The Court expected Congress to present findings as to
how guns in schools affect interstate commerce; however, Congress
made no factual findings of this sort prior to the passage of section
922(q).212 Because of the strong emphasis that the Court placed
on Congress' lack of findings, scholars believe that Lopez has done
nothing more than heighten the fact-finding requirements of
Congress. 213 Because the Supreme Court may be concerned with
Congress's power over non-economic based legislation, a height-
ened fact-finding requirement would be one plausible technique to
curb legislative excess in this area.214 In Lopez, the Court based
its holding on whether the legislation had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and implied that this finding was partially
based on the non-existence of any factual findings by Congress.215
Therefore, if the Court decides to return to the basic rational basis
test when it considers Title III, the heightened fact-finding
requirement of Lopez may be one way for it to slip gracefully out
of any other modifications of the Commerce Clause which Lopez
could be interpreted as setting.216
If Title III is judged under the rational basis test along with a
heightened fact-finding requirement, a strong chance exists that it
will survive Commerce Clause scrutiny because VAWA has a
210. See generally Stephen R. McAllister, Lopez Has Some Merit, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 9, 11 (1996) (discussing the favorable and unfavorable commentaries that Lopez has
generated).
211. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. The Majority found that "to the extent that congress-
ional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgement that the activity in
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here." Id. at 563.
212. See id. 514 U.S. at 562.
213. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 697 (1996).
214. See id. at 728-29.
215. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
216. See Frickey, supra note 213, at 707.
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strong fact-finding basis.217 Before passing VAWA, Congress
made extensive findings and held many hearings in order to
determine the effects of domestic violence on interstate com-
merce.218  Congress thoroughly researched the issue of domestic
violence and made findings supporting the passage of VAWA.219
Although Title III is non-economic based legislation,220 Congress
has still taken the time to make the appropriate findings; and
therefore, a very good chance exists that the provision would be
found constitutional if the standard of review requires simply a
rational basis along with heightened fact-finding.22' However,
Title III may be lacking in other areas which the Court may require
for constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.222
B. Jurisdictional Requirement
Besides heightened fact-finding, the Majority in Lopez also
reprimanded Congress for its lack of a jurisdictional requirement
in section 922(q). 223  As with the heightened fact-finding require-
ment, the Court could plausibly consider the jurisdictional require-
ment as part of its heightened scrutiny under Lopez.2 24 The
Court would then apply a more strict test for legislation which only
tenuously affects interstate commerce. 225  By requiring a jurisdic-
tional element, the Court could limit the applicability of the legisla-
tion to those activities which are substantially related to interstate
commerce. 226 Furthermore, this requirement would limit judicial
inquiry by not requiring a detailed case-by-case analysis of each
217. See supra Part II.
218. See supra Part II.
219. See supra Part II.
220. An example of economic legislation would be similar to that found in Wickard
dealing with the production of goods.
221. See generally Frickey, supra note 213, at 697 (discussing what role legislative fact-
finding plays in assessing the constitutionality of federal legislation passed under the
Commerce Clause).
222. See generally Easterling, supra note 9, at 938-40 (discussing the fact-finding behind
Title III).
223. See United States v. Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). A jurisdiction requirement
would allow a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the violation had the requisite
nexus to interstate commerce.
224. See Robert Wax, United States v. Lopez: The Continued Ambiguity of Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 275, 297 (1996).
225. See id. at 298.
226. See id.
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227 thapplication of the statute. If the Court chooses to modify the
Commerce Clause in this manner, it would mean a heightened
requirement for much of Congress' legislation but one which could
be achieved in future legislation.228 However, Title III may not
be able to satisfy this requirement.2 29
Title III has no jurisdictional requirement which would apply
under Lopez's heightened scrutiny; instead, its only limitation is
that the crime have a gender-based animus. 23° Although Con-
gress did limit Title III by requiring that any action brought under
the provision be a crime of violence motivated by gender, the
legislature did not require proof that the crime affect interstate
commerce. 231' Therefore, it is possible that Title III would not
pass the heightened scrutiny requirement of Lopez because it does
not have a jurisdictional requirement. 32
C. Traditional State Functions
Lopez may be interpreted as placing special limitations upon
Commerce Clause legislation when the subject matter to be
regulated is that which has been traditionally regulated by the
states. 233  The Court in Lopez noted that the states possess
227. See id.
228. VAWA has a provision for interstate enforcement of domestic violence. See 18
U.S.C. § 2261 (1994). This statute has two main offenses:
(1) CROSSING A STATE LINE.-A person who travels across a State line or
enters or leaves Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that
person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of
such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily
injury to such spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished ....
(2) CAUSING THE CROSSING OF A STATE LINE.-A person who causes a
spouse or intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave Indian country
by force, coercion, duress, or fraud, and in the course or as a result of that
conduct, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily
injury to that person's spouse or intimate partner shall be punished ....
Id. This is an example of a jurisdictional requirement which would possibly pass heightened
scrutiny under Lopez.
229. See generally McAllister, supra note 210 (discussing the jurisdictional requirement
in VAWA and its interplay with the holding in Lopez).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (1994).
231. See id.
232. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 787 (W.D.
Va. 1996). Even Judge Kiser in the Brzonkala decision noted that Title III is similar to
Lopez in its lack of a jurisdictional requirement. See id.
233. See Pannier, supra note 209, at 99. Lopez has also been considered "manna from
heaven" for Tenth Amendment worshipers. See Barry C. Toone & Bradley J. Wishirchen,
Great Expectations: The Illusions of Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 22 J. LEGIS. 241
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primary authority when it comes to enforcing criminal law,234 and
the criminal legislation in Lopez was one which is traditionally
reserved to the states.235 The Lopez Court thought that by
allowing such legislation under a "national productivity reasoning"
it would be "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power
even in areas ... where States historically have been sover-
eign."'236 The Court's remarks can be construed in two different
ways. 237  One interpretation of "traditional state function" would
prevent Congress from regulating any matters which are an area of
traditional state power.238 This would be a dramatic limitation
upon Congress' powers because it would prevent it from legislating
in any area of traditional state law. 239 However, another way of
construing this interpretation would be to require regulations
relating to areas of traditional state power to trigger heightened
judicial scrutiny.240 Such an interpretation may not be as signifi-
cant a limit on Congress' commerce clause power.241  However,
either interpretation may have an impact upon Title III because
this provision regulates domestic violence, an area considered to be
one of traditional state concern.242
As noted by the Court in Lopez, family law is a traditional
state function, 243 and domestic violence and rape 2' are both
crimes which have often been considered within traditional state
powers. 245 However, because VAWA reaches directly into state
law by federalizing these crimes, Title III may be subject to
(1996).
234. See United States v. Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). See also Pannier, supra note
209, at 99.
235. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
236. Id. Included in those areas which the Majority feared Congress would regulate was
family law including marriage, divorce, and child custody. See id.




241. See id. at 100.
242. See Vertefeuille, supra note 118.
243. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
244. Domestic violence and rape will most likely form the basis of those crimes brought
under the Title III provision as can be seen from the first two cases brought before the
courts, Brzonkala and Doe.
245. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted that VAWA is an example of Congress
expanding into areas traditionally reserved for the states. See Expanding Federal Court Role
Opposed: Rehnquist Says Congress Is Endangering Quality and Credibility, WASH. POST, Jan.
1, 1992, at A29 [hereinafter Expanding Federal Court].
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heightened scrutiny.2 46  If Lopez is interpreted as barring Con-
gress from legislating on any area traditionally reserved for the
states, then Title III has little chance of surviving a constitutionality
test since the provision regulates a traditional area of state law.
2 47
However, the provision may survive if a less demanding interpreta-
tion is made which would subject Title III to a heightened judicial
scrutiny, such as fact-finding, under which Title III has the neces-
sary requirements. 248  However, depending on what form of
scrutiny the Court decides to apply, Title III may still be in
jeopardy.249  As can be seen from earlier analysis, if heightened
fact-finding is applied then Title III may survive.25° However, the
requirement of a jurisdictional element would be lacking in Title III
and, therefore, could be the possible cause of its demise.25'
D. Substantial Effects Test
Because the Supreme Court has not interpreted Lopez more
precisely when deciding other cases, confusion still exists as to what
specific modifications have been placed on the rational basis
test.252  The jurisdictional requirement, heightened fact finding,
and heightened judicial scrutiny would all be requirements which
would allow the rational basis test to survive relatively unscathed
and still provide Congress with some deference concerning non-
economic legislation. 3  However, there is also the possible
interpretation of Lopez which would take the rational basis test to
a higher level by requiring that all activity regulated by Congress
under the Commerce Clause have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.25 4  The Majority in Lopez held that "Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce., 255  Com-
246. See generally Pannier, supra note 209 (discussing the link between domestic violence
and the traditional role of the state).
247. See id.
248. See generally Frickey, supra note 213 (discussing Lopez and its impact on legislative
fact-finding).
249. See supra Part VII.A-B.
250. See supra Part VII.A.
251. See supra Part VII.B.
252. See Lazer & Hellerstein, supra note 86, at 273.
253. See supra Part VII.A-C.
254. See Carroll & Dehmel, supra note 82, at 592-93.
255. United States v. Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (citing NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
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merce would be substantially affected if a specific piece of
legislation involved any sort of economic enterprise or the
regulation of economic activity.25 6 Furthermore, a substantial ef-
fects test would not require the Court to "pile inferences upon
inferences" in order to determine the effect the legislation would
have on interstate commerce. 7 If Title III was subjected to this
interpretation, a strong possibility exists that the provision would
be found unconstitutional under the substantial effects test.
Title III does not involve the regulation of any sort of
economic activity but instead federalizes violent crimes motivated
by gender which would most likely be considered non-economic
activity.25 8 Although Congress' findings show that crimes of this
sort impede women in the workplace, which in turn hurts the
economy thereby affecting interstate commerce, this may be too
much of the "inference piling" which the Court seeks to avoid. 9
Moreover, although Title III crimes taken as a whole may have a
substantial effect on the economy, singularly, the effect may not be
as significant if the Court finds that crimes in the aggregate will not
be considered.26 ° If the Court interprets Lopez as standing for
the proposition that the rational basis test is now the substantial
effects tests, Title III may not survive since it does not seem to
substantially affect interstate commerce.261
E. Non-Economic and Direct Effect Test
Lopez may also take the requirement of the "direct" effect and
262combine it with the substantial effects requirement. These co
requirements may strip Congress of even more power since it is
possible for a non-economic activity to substantially affect interstate
256. See id. at 560.
257. See id. at 567.
258. See Brzonkala v. Vriginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 790 (W.D.
Va. 1996).
259. See Lopez, 515 U.S. at 567 (Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court would not
pile inference upon inference when determining whether legislation should be upheld under
the Commerce Clause.).
260. See id. at 560. The Court stated that it has and will sustain legislation which
substantially affects interstate commerce even in such far-reaching cases as Wickard. See id.
However, Wickard, unlike section 922(q), involved economic activity. See id.
261. See generally Carroll & Dehmel, supra note 82 (discussing how Lopez has made the
"substantially affects" test the sole test to be applied when examining Commerce Clause
legislation).
262. See Dicky, supra note 112, at 1223-24.
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commerce 263 while it is more difficult to find an activity which
also has a direct effect 264 on interstate commerce. 265  This
heightened requirement may yet again be a type of scrutiny that
Title III would be unable to withstand.266
As noted before, it is highly unlikely that the Court would find
Title III to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce under
the substantial effects test; additionally, the requirement of a direct
effect may be even more difficult to prove.267 When passing Title
III, Congress relied on the determination that a gender-motivated
crime is detrimental to its victim, and this, in turn, causes the victim
to perform less efficiently at work thereby hurting the economy and
affecting interstate commerce.26  This reasoning may not be
considered direct by the Supreme Court and may be viewed as
piling inference upon inference.269 Once again, if Lopez is found
to require more than the rational basis test, it is highly unlikely that
Title III would survive a constitutional challenge.
VIII. The Individual Supreme Court Justices' Views
In order to fully determine how the Supreme Court may
decide Title III's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, an
examination of each individual Justice's thoughts on Congressional
power is necessary. A five to four majority decided Lopez which
makes it very possible that Title III may not suffer the same fate
as section 922(q) if any of the Justices change their vote.27 °
Lopez included two concurrences and three dissents evidencing a
sharply divided court.27 1  Additionally, while Lopez dealt with
263. An example of a case passing the substantial effects test would be Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
264. An example of a case passing the "direct effect" test would be Houston, E. & W.
Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
265. See generally Dicky, supra note 112 (discussing the heightened scrutiny which may
stem from the holding in Lopez).
266. See id.
267. See supra Part VII.D.
268. See supra Part II.B.
269. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
270. See id. at 550.
271. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion to which Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. See id. A separate concurrence was filed
by Justice Kennedy to which Justice O'Connor joined. See id. Justice Thomas also filed his
own concurrence. See id. Justice Stevens and Justice Souter each filed their own separate
dissenting opinions while also joining Justice Breyer in his dissent along with Justice
Ginsburg who chose not to write separately. See id.
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guns in schools, Title III looks at violent crimes motivated by
gender.272 Although these statutes are similar, violence against
women is a very heated topic with many different views.
27 3
Therefore, the Justices from the Majority in Lopez may possibly
change sides and find VAWA to be constitutional.274
A. The Lopez Majority and Its Position on Title III
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a strong majority opinion for
Lopez in which he attempted to narrow Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause.275  Rehnquist's opinion began by giving the
complete history of the Commerce Clause and the many changes
that have occurred over the years.27 6  This history led to the
determination that the activities which Congress regulates under
the Commerce Clause must pass a substantial effects test in order
to be found constitutional. 277 Rehnquist found that non-economic
activities must be carefully scrutinized in order to prevent Congress
from usurping too much power from both the individual and the
State.278 Rehnquist's main theme throughout the opinion was to
try to narrow Congress's power in the arena of non-economic
activities by requiring a heightened scrutiny for these types of legis-
lation, thereby curbing any power Congress may try to take from
the states.
279
Rehnquist will most likely carry these ideals over to any
decision concerning Title III's constitutionality under the Com-
merce Clause.2"' A positive showing of this can be made through
a statement in the Lopez majority opinion that "under the
Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens: family law for example.
281
272. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 612-13 (D. Conn. 1996).
273. See Geroux, supra note 5.
274. See Toone & Wishirchen, supra note 233, at 241.
275. See Dickey, supra note 112, at 1207.
276. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-58.
277. See id. at 559.
278. See id. at 564. Rehnquist tried to prevent as much leeway as possible for Congress
by finding that even Wickard could not apply in Lopez. See id. at 560. Rehnquist different-
iated Wickard, which allows activities to be taken as a whole rather than singularly and,
therefore, has a greater affect on Congress, by finding that Wickard had an economic basis
unlike section 922(q). See id.
279. See id. at 567-68.
280. See Expanding Federal Court, supra note 245.
281. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
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Rehnquist went on to state that family law is one of the areas that
is traditionally a sovereign state power to which Congress should
not interfere.282
Furthermore, Rehnquist has already stated his displeasure with
VAWA. 283 In the 1991 year-end report on the federal judiciary,
he said that Congress is endangering the quality of federal courts
by making federal cases of too many crimes and that "[u]nless
checked, the result will be a degradation in the high quality of
justice the nation has long expected of the federal courts.'
284
Rehnquist also remarked that Congress should not expand federal
court jurisdiction to "intrude into areas of the law that have
traditionally been reserved to the state courts., 28 5  Rehnquist
additionally expressed his dismay concerning VAWA stating that
this piece of legislation "could involve federal courts in a whole
host of domestic relations disputes. '286 Rehnquist's top concern
seemed to be that VAWA would be used as a tool in divorce,2 7
and, for this reason Congress should try to moderately curtail the
act.288
Because of Rehnquist's dismay for Congress' involvement with
state law and the distinct possibility that VAWA would be
considered the federal criminalizing of traditional state law, the
Chief Justice would most likely show little favor toward Title
111.289 Furthermore, in Lopez, Rehnquist specifically curtailed
Congress' power over non-economic activities by applying a
heightened scrutiny test to section 922(q). 290 As both the Brzon-
kala and Doe cases accorded, Title III would fall under activities
regulated by Congress which are non-economic in nature.291
Rehnquist may concur in this finding and, similar to Lopez, subject
282. See id.
283. See Siegel, supra note 170, at 2198-99.
284. See Expanding Federal Court, supra note 245.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Rehnquist may have some legitimate backing for this belief. In Doe, the husband
was a multimillionaire and the wife could have been using VAWA as a means of retrieving
some of his money prior to a divorce. There is no evidence that the petitioners were
divorced at the time of the case. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996).
288. See Expanding Federal Court, supra note 245.
289. See id.
290. See United States v. Lopez, 515 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
291. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 795 (W.D.
Va. 1996); Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 612.
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Title III to heightened scrutiny." Furthermore, considering
Rehnquist's position on non-economic legislation, he would most
likely apply a more strict interpretation of Lopez.293 For these
reasons, if Title III were to reach the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist would most likely take the first step in curtailing VAWA
by finding Title III unconstitutional. Additionally, he would
probably not be alone in this finding.
Joining the Chief Justice in the Lopez majority opinion was
Justice Scalia.294 Since Justice Scalia did not write his own
concurrence, it can be inferred that he was in complete agreement
with Rehnquist.295 However, the precedent set forth by Lopez,
which Scalia and Rehnquist have chosen to follow, may not be
strong enough to prevent Title III from passing judicial scrut-
iny.29 The Majority in Lopez attempts to distinguish Wickard on
the ground that Wickard involved economic activity while Lopez
was based on non-economic activity.297 However, in Wickard, the
Court was concerned with the effect on interstate commerce rather
than the source of the injury.298 Additionally, later cases such as
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States299 and Perez v. United
States3" involved activities which did not substantially affect
interstate commerce anymore than the activity in Lopez or even
that of VAWA, thereby confirming that it is irrelevant whether
legislation is based upon economic activity.3"1 Therefore, the
292. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
293. In other words, Rehnquist would not view Lopez as just requiring heightened fact
finding or a jurisdictional requirement for cases involving traditional state functions. Instead,
he may require a substantial effects test or a direct impact upon interstate commerce.
294. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550.
295. See id.
296. See Zeigler, supra note 66, at 1389, 1394.
297. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
298. See Zeigler, supra note 66, at 1391-92. Wickard would most likely be the strongest
precedent for VAWA because it was the main basis for the decision in Doe. See Doe v.
Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 614 (D. Conn. 1996). In Wickard, the Supreme Court said Congress
could regulate activities which, taken as a whole, substantially affect interstate commerce.
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). Because Title III involves non-economic
activities and perhaps would be weaker in this area, it may be easier to prove that the
aggregate effect on women of gender-motivated crimes substantially affects interstate com-
merce.
299. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (concerning Congress' power to pass the Civil Rights Act under
the Commerce Clause).
300. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (concerning Congress' power to federalize crime under the
Commerce Clause).
301. See Zeigler, supra note 66, at 1396-97.
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precedent set forth in Lopez, along with the interpretation of the
cases used to uphold it, may not be that strong considering the
history of the Commerce Clause.3' For this reason, Scalia and
Rehnquist may have a problem maintaining their majority if Title
III should come before the Court.
One vote that will definitely remain with the Lopez majority
is that of Justice Clarence Thomas. °3 Justice Thomas wrote his
own concurrence in Lopez in which he argued that Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause should be narrowed even
further.3" Thomas agreed with the result in Lopez, but urged a
more thorough review of the Commerce Clause power including
the separation of federal and state power.30 5  Thomas, like
Rehnquist, noted that the federal government should not be given
power to control those activities which are usually controlled by the
states.3" Justice Thomas even went on to suggest that in future
Commerce Clause cases the Court must narrow Congress' power
even further.30 7
Based on Justice Thomas' concurring opinion, which emphas-
izes a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause,3" he
would not likely find Title III to be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause. For Justice Thomas, keeping traditional state
law away from the grasp of the federal powers is important.3 9
Because Title III focuses on traditional areas of state law such as
domestic violence and crimes of rape, Thomas will likely consider
Title III out of Congress's reach.310 Furthermore, Thomas might
see VAWA as a vehicle for taking the substantial effects test even
further, a goal which is possible with the backing of both Rehnquist
and Scalia.3" However, even with these three judges firmly
backing Lopez, the Title III provision may still prevail because the
302. See id.
303. See generally Graglia, supra note 73, at 762 (discussing Justice Thomas' dissent).
304. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995).
305. See Carroll, supra note 82, at 587.
306. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585.
307. See id.
308. See Carroll & Dehmel, supra note 82, at 587.
309. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585.
310. See generally Carroll & Dehmel, supra note 82, at 587 (discussing Justice Thomas'
dissent).
311. See Toone & Wishirchen, supra note 233, at 262-63 (discussing the ability of Rehn-
quest, Scalia, and Thomas to hold on to the centrist votes of Kennedy and O'Connor).
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other majority votes of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are not
quite as certain.1 2
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which Justice O'Connor
joined,313 suggested that the Majority's opinion may not extend
beyond the unique circumstances in Lopez."4 In this concur-
rence, Kennedy gave his own version of the Commerce Clause
history which evidenced a greater respect for the scope of the
federal powers"' and was somewhat different than Rehnquest's his-
tory.316 Based on this history, Kennedy found that the Court
must take responsibility in reviewing the balance between the
federal and state governments, which requires the Court to step in
only if either government should sway the balance of power to
their favor.317 In the Lopez case, Kennedy found the balance to
be upset because the federal government was attempting to take
over crimes traditionally governed by the States.318 This action
by the federal government required the Court to intercede in order
to bring the scales of power back into balance.1 9 Kennedy also
thought that the problem of guns in schools was one which the
states could best solve by performing "their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution
is far from clear."32 Kennedy agreed with the Majority's decision
to find section 922(q) unconstitutional because the statute substan-
tially interfered with the states' traditional power while its effects
on interstate commerce were not strong enough to warrant
acceptance.
3 21
Considering this concurring opinion, both Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor may find VAWA constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause. Kennedy counsels great restraint in his Lopez
opinion and is willing to allow the Court to interfere only when the
312. See id.
313. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568.
314. See Dickey, supra note 112, at 1220.
315. See Epstein, supra note 208, at 167.
316. It is this history which caused Kennedy to hesitate with Rehnqist's findings. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568. In his concurrence Kennedy states, "that history gives me some
pause about today'.s decision." Id.
317. See id. at 578.
318. See id. at 577. Kennedy quotes the Federalist Papers for his interpretation that "the
essence of responsibility for a shift in power from the State to the Federal Government rests
upon a political judgement." Id.
319. See id. at 580.
320. Id. at 581.
321. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583.
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scales have been tipped to a great extent.322 Additionally, Ken-
nedy was fact-specific in finding that legislating guns in schools was
something that should remain for the states since many states
already had their own laws concerning these types of crimes and
were experimenting with different options on their own.323
Although many states already have their own laws for domestic
violence, this does not hurt Title III because one of the reasons for
the passage of VAWA was Congress' finding that the state laws
were not strong enough to protect victims of gender-motivated
crimes." Thus, if Kennedy finds that Title III is filling a gap left
by the states, then it is possible that he will find Title III constitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause.325 Furthermore, since Justice
O'Connor agreed with Kennedy in this case, it is possible that she
will follow him in a decision concerning Title III as well.3 26 These
two votes could cause a shift in majority and allow for the passage
of Title 111.327
B. Dissenters of Lopez and Their Positions on Title III
Dissenting, Justice Stevens agreed with both Justices Breyer
and Souter in finding that Congress has the power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate guns in schools.3" He also added
that guns were articles of commerce and that their possession
directly or indirectly affected commercial activity.329  Justice
Stevens found that there was enough evidence that guns in schools
were such a problem that Congress needed to regulate them.330
Justice Stevens' opinion may bode well for Title III's constitu-
tional challenge.331 Congress made many more findings concern-
ing the problem of domestic violence than the findings in Lopez
322. See Lazer & Hellerstein, supra note 86, at 273-74.
323. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 582.
324. See McDermott, supra note 15.
325. See id. McDermott discusses how the state system is overwhelmed and that federal
action is now needed. See id.
326. See generally Graglia, supra note 73, at 757-58 (discussing the center views of
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor).
327. See Toone & Wishirchen, supra note 233, at 264 (discussing possible defection of
Kennedy and O'Connor).
328. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602.
329. See id. at 602-03.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 602.
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upon which Justice Stevens' relies.3 32 Additionally, the legislature
specifically stated how domestic violence had an effect on interstate
commerce; Congress did not leave this inference for the Court to
determine on its own as it was forced to do in Lopez.333 How-
ever, a problem may exist because, unlike guns, domestic violence
is not an article of commerce.334 Justice Stevens emphasized that
guns were articles of commerce thereby implying that his dissent
was based upon this fact.335 However, the brevity of his opinion
results in difficulty when trying to determine whether increased
fact-finding would sway Justice Stevens' decision concerning the
constitutionality of Title 111.336
Justice Souter also dissented, and, like Justice Stevens, his
findings seem to support upholding Title III's constitutionality.
337
Souter felt that the Majority in Lopez forced the Commerce Clause
power into an unworkable precedent.338 Souter saw this new
precedent as being a return to the ineffective "direct/indirect" test
of earlier years.339 Souter noted that painful lessons had been
learned throughout the history of the Commerce Clause and that
the Court was now returning to these problems through its opinion
in Lopez.34 ° Souter instead found that the correct standard of
review was the rational basis test and that the standard should not
change even despite concerns of competing state and federal
legislation.341' However, he also found that the majority opinion
was incorrect by deciding that findings of fact may have served to
rescue section 922(q) in Lopez.3 42 Souter believed that findings
of fact made no difference in the standard of review given to
congressional legislation.343
Quite probably, based on this dissent, Justice Souter would
find that VAWA was constitutional under the Commerce
332. Congress made no findings of fact for the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990;
however, there were extensive findings for VAWA. See supra Part II.B.
333. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
334. See id. at 602-03.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 603.
338. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604.
339. See id. at 608.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 611.
342. See id. at 612.
343. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 614.
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Clause.3" Souter thinks that all legislation should be judged on
the rational basis test which Title III would be able to pass quite
easily.3 45  Furthermore, Souter does not feel that the rational
basis test should be changed just because the legislation may
regulate activity which is an area of state concern.346  Since
VAWA regulates activity which is usually considered a traditional
area of state activity, it is important that Souter does not find a
heightened scrutiny requirement for legislation such as this.
347
However, Souter also found that no deference should be given
based on any form of fact-finding done by Congress.3 48 Although
Souter may not give such deference to VAWA, which has a great
deal of fact-finding, he does believe that the legislation should be
considered under the rational basis test.3 49 Title III would most
likely be able to withstand such a test. Therefore, according to
Souter, the Court may not have to rely on heightened fact-finding
in order to find Title III constitutional under the Commerce Clause
power. Furthermore, Souter seemed to stress that Lopez would not
be a prevailing precedent by stating: "[T]oday's decision may be
seen only as a misstep, its reasoning and its suggestions not quite
in gear with the prevailing standard, but hardly an epochal
case."35  He implied that the findings and holding of Lopez351
may only apply to Lopez therefore leaving the Court open to
decide VAWA in a totally different manner.
Justice Breyer also took a strong stand against the majority
opinion in Lopez; however, he chose to decide Lopez based mainly
on the facts of the case.352 He found that three basic principles
of Commerce Clause interpretation exist which, when parred down,
form the rational basis test.353 Breyer determined that the Court
must give Congress some deference under the Commerce Clause,
344. See id. at 603.
345. See id. at 613.
346. See id. at 610.
347. See id. at 614.
348. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 612.
349. See id. at 1657.
350. Id. at 614-15.
351. See id. at 614.
352. See id. at 618-19.
353. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-17. Breyer stated the principals as: whether the activity
has significant impact on commerce, the cumulative effect of all similar instances, and the
connection between a regulated activity and interstate commerce. See id.
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and he described this leeway as rational basis.354 Breyer then
took the facts and findings of Lopez and determined that they fell
under the rational basis required of them.355 Additionally, Breyer
noted that the majority opinion in Lopez created legal uncertainty
in an area that was reasonably well settled, ran contrary to modern
precedent, and tried to differentiate between commercial and
noncommercial transactions.35 6 Breyer found the majority opinion
to be at most problematical, and, thus, he applied the rational basis
test in order to determine whether section 922(q) was constitu-
tional.357
Under Breyer's findings in Lopez, it seems highly probable
that he would find Title III to be constitutional.3 58  Breyer found
that non-economic activity should be judged under the rational
basis test, and he is willing to allow Congress deference if it
determines, through legislative fact-finding, that the legislation does
have an effect on interstate commerce. 359  However, Breyer's
dissent may be too broad and far reaching.3 6' He does not
mention a limiting principle for Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause, and this may prevent a majority from joining
him in his legal findings. 361 Although Title III may meet the
criteria needed for Breyer's vote, it may stretch too far into the
traditional state area to allow the other Justices to join with
him.362
354. See id. at 616-17.
355. See id. at 620-23.
356. See id. at 630-31.
357. See id. at 626-31.
358. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615.
359. See id. at 618-25. Breyer applies congressional findings for section 922(q), which
occurred after the passage of the law, to his analysis under the Commerce Clause. See id.
at 620-23.
360. See Graglia, supra note 73, at 766.
361. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565, 599. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
noted in their opinions that Justice Breyer's dissent lacked a limiting principle which was
necessary to prevent Congress from usurping all powers away from the states. See id.
362. See Lazer & Hellerstein, supra note 86, at 269. However, Justice Souter, in his
dissent, stated that the Commerce Clause power was plenary. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609.
See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (discussing local government's role);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (discussing the role of local
government); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (discussing environmental problems associated with surface mining); United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (discussing a statute which criminalized firearm possession);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (discussing minimum wage).
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One Justice who may follow Breyer in the Title III question is
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg who joined in Breyer's Lopez dis-
sent.363 However, Ginsburg did not write her own dissent signify-
ing her concern over the possible federalization of state crimes."
Ginsburg did write the majority opinion in the Virginia Military
Institute case which allowed women to enter into an all-male school
implying that she promotes gender-based equality.365 However,
some commentators believe that her basis for that opinion was
equality whereas Title III may be considered victim feminism.366
Justice Ginsburg's views on VAWA and its effect on women may
determine under which what basis the Act is held constitutional
under the Commerce Clause.
IX. Conclusion
In all likelihood, the question of Title III's constitutionality will
eventually reach the Supreme Court. Although the Court may
choose to base its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment, such an
approach seems highly unlikely at this juncture. By deciding Title
III under the Commerce Clause provision, the Court will have the
ability to apply Lopez and allow lower courts and Congress to
finally understand how Lopez modifies the Commerce Clause and
how it applies to non-economic activities.
Because Title III is a controversial piece of legislation but also
provides an important remedy for victims of domestic violence, it
will most likely create an interesting outcome among the Justices
of the Court. Although Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas will
probably vote against Title III, from Justice Kennedy's concurrence
in Lopez it is very possible that he and Justice O'Connor will join
Justices Souter, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg in finding Title III
to be constitutional under the rational basis test. Additionally, if
363. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615.
364. See id.
365. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
366. See Young, supra note 163. As part of the congressional debates over VAWA,
Congressman Craig presented an article from the Washington Post which said VAWA
"genuflects at every altar in the feminist church." 140 CONG. REC. S12,566-01, S12,584 (Aug.
25, 1994). Additionally, feminists have been accused of exaggerating the problem of violence
against women. See Armin Brott, Examining Domestic Violence; Overstating Abuse of
Women Harms Victims Eventually, Hous. POST, Aug. 14, 1994, at Cl. Furthermore, some
have noted the coincidence that a female judge upheld Title III while a male judge found
the law unconstitutional. See David E. Rovella, He Rules. She Rules on Violence Law,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at A8.
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this occurs, the "Majority" would probably choose to modify the
Commerce Clause via a heightened scrutiny standard which would
require either heightened fact-finding or a jurisdictional require-
ment.
However, until the Supreme Court makes its final decision on
Title III, many women like Jane Doe and Christy Brzonkala may
be estopped from using Title III for the purposes Congress
intended: to give victims of gender-motivated violence a desper-
ately needed federal remedy. Some women will win their fights at
the lower and appellate levels while others will lose. However,
only when the Supreme Court makes its final decision will the real
winners and losers of the provision truly be determined.
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